Geography vs. Institutions at the Village Level by Grimm, Michael & Klasen, Stephan
IZA DP No. 3391



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
March 2008 





ISS, The Hague  
 
Stephan Klasen 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 






Geography vs. Institutions at the Village Level
*
 
There is a well-known debate about the roles of geography versus institutions in explaining 
the long-term development of countries. These debates have usually been based on cross-
country regressions where questions about parameter heterogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity, and endogeneity cannot easily be controlled for. The innovation of Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) was to address this last point by using settler mortality as an 
instrument for geography-induced endogenous institutions and found that this supported their 
line of reasoning. We believe there is value-added to consider this debate at the micro level 
within a country as particularly questions of parameter heterogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity are likely to be smaller than between countries. Moreover, at the micro level it 
is possible to identify more precise transmission mechanisms from geography via institutions 
to economic development outcomes. In particular, we examine the determinants of economic 
development across villages on the Indonesian Island of Sulawesi and find that geography-
induced endogenous emergence of land rights is the critical institutional link between 
geographic conditions and technological change. We therefore highlight and empirically 
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The majority of the world’s poor resides in rural areas and derives a significant share of their 
incomes from agriculture.  As has been demonstrated empirically many times in the literature, 
sustainable income growth and poverty reduction in rural areas requires improvements in 
agricultural productivity (e.g. Datt and Ravallion, 1996, 2002; Byerlee, Diao and Jackson, 
2005; Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Grimm, Klasen and McKay, 2007; Thurlow and Wobst, 
2007, World Bank, 2007). Key to such agricultural productivity improvements are 
improvements in agricultural production technologies. Thus the critical question arises what 
are the key drivers of technological change in agriculture.  This is of particular relevance in 
regions where land is still available for conversion to agricultural use, as these are typically 
the areas where individual property rights are absent or not well defined which might 
constrain investments in land improvement and new technologies (see e.g. Binswanger, 
Deininger, and Feder 1995).  This situation applies to much of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also 
significant portions of Latin America and Asia where lowland savannahs and forested areas 
continue to represent an internal land frontier that is available for being converted to 
agricultural uses. 
 
When studying the literature on determinants of agricultural productivity growth, several 
seemingly competing hypotheses are invoked. A first strand of the literature argues that 
geography, such as climate, landform and soil quality of the cultivated land area, is the 
dominant factor in determining agricultural productivity and the techniques to use (see e.g. 
Diamond, 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1998). A second strand of the literature 
emphasizes population size and density, and associated pressure on land, inducing 
technological improvements or the adoption of new existing technologies (see e.g. Boserup 
1981; Kremer, 1993; Klasen and Nestmann, 2006). A third strand of the literature emphasizes 
the role of endogenous institutional change as critical for improvements in agriculture (North, 
1990; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).  Within that literature, the role of land rights has received 
particular emphasis (e.g. Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder, 1995; Deininger, 2003). 
According to this argument, land rights would provide security to the land owner, would 
lower the cost of trading land and could be used as collateral for credit. This in turn would 
have a positive impact on investment in land improvement as well as new and more 
productive cultivation technologies.  
 
However, the literature also emphasizes that land rights have to be considered as endogenous, 
responding, among others, to past investment decisions in the land, land scarcity, land quality, 
as well as the differential power of different rural groups (e.g. Binswanger, Deininger, and 
Feder, 1995; Rozelle and Li, 1998; Besley, 1995; Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau, 2002). The 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of land rights is quite mixed, as will be discussed 
below. 
 
These three strands of the literature have evolved quite independently and there are only few 
studies that explicitly test the relative importance or the inter-relationships between these 
competing hypotheses. 
 
In this paper, we suggest a theoretical argument which links these three potential explanations 
and then proceed to test these linkages empirically. We argue that migration to a land frontier 
is driven by a favorable geography, and that high migration and associated population growth 
in turn intensify land pressure in these areas. Land pressure induces communities to opt for 
land rights, which in turn increase the incentive of farmers to invest in agricultural 
technology. Eventually, agricultural technology enhances agricultural growth and economic 
  2development. In short, endogenously generated institutional change is the core element of our 
transmission channel from geography to technological change. 
 
In this sense, our argument is a “micro version” of the well-known “Institutions Hypothesis”, 
which tries to explain long run differences in economic development across countries with 
lasting differences in the quality of endogenously generated institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001), who are some of the principal advocates of this hypothesis, use this 
argument to explain the differential economic performance of countries.  They argue that 
Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, resulting in 
different institutions across the developing world. In places where Europeans faced high 
mortality rates (i.e. unfavorable geographic conditions), they could not settle and were more 
likely to set up extractive institutions. In places where they faced relatively low mortality 
rates, they settled and set up institutions favorable for individual entrepreneurship. These 
institutions have persisted to the present, so the argument, and explain to a large extent 
differences in economic development across countries. In this study, geography has no direct 
impact on economic development, once geography-induced institutions are taken into 
account.  
 
Our study shows how exactly geography-induced institutional change could have caused 
economic development. Our objective is not to rule out completely a direct influence of 
geography on economic development, but to show a mechanism which might be hidden in the 
more macro-economic literature supporting the institutions hypothesis. We use an original 
village level data set, which was collected in 2001 in 80 villages situated close to or in the 
Lore Lindu National Park on the Indonesian Island of Sulawesi, where land at the rainforest 
margin has been progressively converted to agricultural land. Although, the villages we 
analyze share many common features and are spread over a relatively limited area, they also 
differ significantly with respect to their level and the dynamic of well-being, geography, 
technology and institutions. Some of these villages stagnate, while others developed fast in 
the past twenty years. Our analysis will reveal at least one explanation why this was the case. 
 
The reminder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our 
theoretical argument. In Section three we present our data and provide the relevant 
information about our study area. In Section four we lay out our estimation strategy. In 
Section five we present our results and provide many robustness tests. In Section six we draw 
some policy implications and conclude.  
 
 
2. A micro version of the “Institutions Hypothesis” 
 
There is well-known debate about the respective roles of geography versus institutions in 
explaining the long-term development of countries.  While some (e.g. Diamond, 1997; Gallup 
et al., 1998; Sachs, 2003) argue that geographic factors, such as location in the tropics, being 
land-locked and distant from markets, or being susceptible to particular diseases have a direct 
impact on reducing the economic potential or regions, the opposing view is that institutions 
such as property rights and the rule of law are much more important determinants of long-
term economic progress (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004).  Those in the latter camp allow, 
however, for the fact that institutions have evolved endogenously responding to, among other 
things, geographic conditions.  This is done most explicitly in Acemoglu et al. (2001) where 
geographic conditions, particularly a high disease burden, affected European settlement 
patterns which in turn led to extractive institutions in non-settler economies and development-
  3friendly institutions in settler economies. Through historical persistence, these institutions still 
heavily influence the economic fate of nations today. 
 
These debates have usually been based on cross-country regressions where questions about 
parameter heterogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity cannot easily be 
controlled for. Moreover, these studies cannot say much how exactly institutions shaped the 
pattern of economic development. Typically used proxies for institutions such as “a measure 
of social infrastructure” (used in Hall and Jones, 1999), “the risk of expropriation of private 
foreign investment by government” (used in Acemoglu et al., 2001) or Kaufmann’s 
institutions index (used in Easterly and Levine, 2003) are rather broad measures and it is 
difficult to say how they influenced decisions of workers, farmers and entrepreneurs.  
 
Therefore, we believe there is value-added to consider the institutions hypothesis at the micro 
level within a country as this allows examining in more detail what kind of institutions matter 
and how in turn these are determined. In this paper we focus on legal government titles for 
agricultural land and argue that those are a critical driver of agricultural development. We also 
show that the introduction of land titles on the village level is driven by geography. Thus, 
similar to Acemoglu et al. (2001) and others we attribute to geography an indirect role on 
economic development through its effect on institutions.  
 
The causal chain we have in mind is as follows. We argue that immigration to the villages in 
our study region is driven by the geographic features of these villages. Villages with relatively 
high immigration in turn experience population pressure on increasingly scarce land 
resources. Land pressure induces villages to regulate their land market and to opt for land 
rights, which in turn increase investments in agricultural technology. Eventually, agricultural 
technology enhances agricultural growth and economic development. In what follows, we 
discuss each element of that causal chain in more detail.  
 
In a context in which rural-rural migration is still widespread it is reasonable to believe that 
prospective migrants select their destination according to its geographic traits. The landform, 
the soil quality and rainfall are certainly factors which will be considered by the migrant as 
they may determine the return on agricultural activity. For instance fields on steep slopes 
require much more labor input for the same return than flat fields. They are also much more 
difficult to irrigate. Hence, it is very likely that in a highly agrarian economy labor moves, all 
else equal, to localities where the geography is favorable for agriculture.  
 
In the absence of endogenous institutional and technological change, such a process of 
migration could lead to an equilibrium where returns are equalized across villages, and thus 
villages would converge to similar income levels.  But we are arguing that the endogenous 
institutional and technological change creates opposing diverging forces where the places 
with favorable geography will also experience favorable technological change and slow down 
or entirely prevent such convergence processes.
1   
 
Increasing population density and associated land pressure is likely to lead to tensions and 
conflict about the distribution of land providing an incentive for villagers to opt for land 
management institutions and in particular for land rights which clarify property relations and 
reduce tensions and conflicts over land distribution. “Land rights” can take very different 
forms according to the level of security they promise as discussed in detail by Braselle et al. 
                                                 
1 In this sense our work is also related to the insights from the New Economic Geography literature on the 
agglomeration versus congestion dynamics (see e.g., Krugman, 1991). Moreover, even if one posits that 
migration generates long-run convergence processes we would only be observing part of this long-run transition. 
  4(2002). Here we mean transfer rights, which include rights to sell, rent, bequeath, pledge, 
mortgage and gift the land, which is registered and protected by a legal title.  
 
Once land rights are established, we assume that given this security in the right to use the land 
durably increases investments in that land.  This may happen for three reasons (see e.g. 
Brasselle  et al., 2002). First, tenure security increases the return on long-term land 
improvements and conservation measures and therefore farmers have a higher incentive to 
undertake investments (the ‘assurance effect’). Second, with land rights it is easier to sell or 
rent the land and thus to realize improvements made through investments enhancing such 
investments (the ‘realizability effect’). Third, land titles allow to use land as a collateral, 
which in turn facilitates access to credit and enables the farmer to finance investments, short-
term such as fertilizer and pesticides (which have often to be financed in the pre-harvest 
period) and long-term such as tree planting, the construction of terraces or an irrigation 
system (the ‘collateralisation effect’).  
 
Despite their theoretical plausibility the empirical evidence regarding the existence of these 
effects is rather mixed. Besley (1995) for instance, looked at two regions in Ghana and 
confirmed only for one of them the positive impact of land rights on investment. Braselle et 
al. (2002) analyze a region in Burkina Faso and also do not find any systematic influence of 
land tenure security on investment. Jacoby and Minten (2007) analyze the case of Madagascar 
and conclude similar to the former study that having a land title has no significant effect on 
plot-specific investment. Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel et al. (1991) and Place and Hazell 
(1993) are other pessimistic examples for Sub-Saharan Africa. However, Deiniger (2003, 
Chapter 2) provides a number of examples in particular, but not only, from Asia and Latin 
America where land titles increased investment. Broeck, Newman and Tarp (2007) is another 
recent study which found a positive impact in Vietnam, but the authors emphasise that the 
positive effect only arises if land titles are exclusive and if they provide also ownership rights 
and not only user rights. More generally, formalization seems particularly attractive where 
traditional tenure systems are weak, where the return on investment in land is high and where 
collaterized lending exists. These conditions are likely to apply in many regions in Latin 
America and Asia, including our study region, but less so in Sub-Saharan Africa which might 
explain the lack of effects of land rights on investments there.  
 
Of course the empirical challenge in analyzing this relationship is to control for the possible 
endogeneity of land rights with respect to investment. This endogeneity can stem from 
different sources. Farmers may register more often parcels that benefit from relatively high 
levels of investment, or that more profitable farms make it easier to bear the costs of land 
registration. It might also be that investments such as tree planting are undertaken to enhance 
tenure security. However, the latter rather applies in a setting of informal land titling. 
According to our hypothesized causal chain, we will show that geography induced population 
pressure is a decisive determinant of land rights and this may also serve as a relevant and 
exogenous instrument when investments are regressed on the existence of land titles.  
 
Finally we assume, and this is the last element of our hypothesis, that technology plays a 
crucial role for agricultural productivity and thus economic development of villages inhabited 
by individuals who draw more or less their total income from agriculture. The importance of 
technology adoption for productivity improvements has been shown many times in the 
literature. In Indonesia for instance a growth accounting exercise suggests that over the period 
1980 to 1998 11% of the agricultural growth can be attributed to the expansion of irrigated 
land, 20% to the increase in fertilizer use and 10% to the accumulation of capital (Mundlak, 
Larson and Butzer, 2002). All these components involve technology adoption.  
  5 
The reader might notice some similarity between our hypothesis and the one by Boserup 
(1981). Boserup (1981) argued convincingly that demographic pressure and associated food 
shortages would induce technological improvements or the adoption of new existing 
technologies. A rising population density would force individuals to modify the mode of soil 
use and to employ progressively modern agricultural tools. The argument put forward in our 
paper is consistent with Boserup’s line of reasoning, but the crucial issue is, that we assume 
that institutional change is the critical intermediate variable between population and 
technology. Without that institutional change investments in new technologies will not take 
place for the reasons given above.  
 
In our analysis we will not try to show that geography has no direct impact on economic 
development although we think that its impact through institutional change is much more 
important.
2 We focus rather, as mentioned above, on one microeconomic mechanisms which 
may be behind the institutions hypothesis put forward by the macroeconomic literature. 
 
In what follows, we test and illustrate our hypothesized causal chain empirically using village 





3. Data and study context 
 
3.1. Data  
The village survey we use was conducted during March to July in 2001 in the Lore Lindu 
region. This region includes the Lore Lindu National Park and the five surrounding sub-
districts. It is situated south of Palu, the provincial capital of Central Sulawesi/Indonesia. The 
survey is part of an international and interdisciplinary research program known as “Stability 
of Rain Forest Margins” (STORMA) which studies the determinants of biodiversity and land 
use in this region and how such biodiversity can be protected through appropriate 
socioeconomic mechanisms. For the survey 80 of the 119 villages in the region were selected 
using a stratified random sampling method (Zeller, Schwarze and van Rheenen, 2002). The 
survey collected data on current and past demographics, land use practices and technology 
adoption, conservation issues, infrastructure and qualitative information on income and well-
being. Additional information on agricultural technology, population and geographic features 
was collected from secondary data such as village census data and the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and added to the data set by Maertens, Zeller and Birner (2006). A further 
particularity of the data set is that it contains not only detailed information for the survey year, 
but for selected variables also retrospective information, such that variations over space and 
time can be examined and used to test our hypothesis. Identification is facilitated by the fact 
that variations in the data over time and space are sizeable (see also below). 
                                                 
2 In contrast to Acemoglu et al. (2001) who argue that settler mortality rates are uncorrelated with the current 
disease environment and thus current economic performance in these countries we do not have such an 
instrument at our disposal. 
3 This does not, of course, preclude that other transmission mechanisms might also be relevant. But the empirical 
results are fully consistent with the argument we advance here. 
  63.2 Study context 
 
3.2.1 The role of agriculture 
The Lore Lindu region is rural. 87% of the 33,000 households living in the region depend 
economically on agriculture. 15% of the total area—excluding the National Park—is used for 
agricultural production. The rest of the area is mainly grasslands and forests. The principal 
food crop is sawah rice (‘sawah’ means wet rice field or paddy). Important cash crops are 
cocoa and coffee. Households mainly operate as smallholders and with very few exceptions 
there are almost no large plantations in the region (see Maertens et al., 2006). Logging is 
either done informally (mainly for land conversion and not for selling the wood) and has then 
only a marginal importance for the local population or is done formally but then by 
companies from outside the Lore Lindu Region and has again no impact on local incomes. 
 
3.2.2 Migration 
During the past decades a significant part of the immigration into the study region has taken 
place from the south and middle-west of Sulawesi to the north-east of the Lore Lindu region, 
in particular to the districts of Palolo, Sigi Biromaru and Lore Utara. Some immigration has 
also taken place within so called ‘transmigration programs’, organized by the government 
mainly during the 1960s and 1970s. These programs resettled people in particular from the 
islands Java, Bali and Lombok in Central-Sulawesi. The places were chosen according to 
factors such as soil fertility and land availability (Faust, Maertens, Weber et al., 2003). Most 
of these migrants have today returned and the programs are seen as having failed. In our 
sample only three villages were affected by such migration programs during the period 1990-
2001. We excluded these three villages from our sample. No village was affected by these 
programs during the 1980s.  
 
3.2.3 Land rights 
Land rights became more and more widespread over time in the Lore Lindu region. Some 
villages have had land rights since the early 1980s others introduced them only recently and a 
significant share of the villages is even today without such titles. In the villages where land 
titles exist they were in most cases established in the framework of the land certification 
schemes PRONA (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria) and PRODA (Program Proyek Agraria 
Daerah), which can provide ownership rights to land holders. These schemes were created by 
the Indonesian Government in 1981. However, no central or decentral government beyond the 
village level ever enforced land titling and land redistribution in the study area using these 
mechanisms. PRONA/PRODA is rather an available scheme which can be used if there is a 
demand and the willingness to opt for land titling by villagers (Siagian and Neldysavrino, 
2007). The costs of land titling under these schemes have to be borne by the villagers. The 
process of land titling needs collective action by the villagers and usually starts with a 
proposal to the land administration office. This implies that the process of land titling is - 
consistent with our hypothesis - demand and not supply driven. In villages where land rights 
were established outside of PRONA/PRODA-scheme, the titles were usually issued by village 
leaders, but they also usually provide ownership rights and not only management rights. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that formal and informal credit is available in the study 




  74. Estimation strategy 
 
First, we show that in the Lore Lindu Region agricultural technology is an important driver of 
agricultural household income. Although the empirical literature has shown many times that 
technology drives agricultural development, we think it is important to show that this link is 
also significant in our case. Therefore, we estimate using ordinary least-squares (OLS) the 
following equation: 
 
i i i i X A Y ε γ α µ + + + =
' ' , (1a) 
 
where the index i stands for the villages. Since the survey does not provide any information 
on village mean income or alike, we use the percentage of all houses in each village built 
from stone, bricks or cement. Throughout the Lore Lindu region having a stone house is seen 
as sign of prosperity and wealth and therefore that variable should be a good measure of the 
villager’s long term living standard, Y. As can be seen in Table 1, the share of stone houses 
varies significantly in our data set and therefore should contain enough information about 
differences in well-being across villages and over time.
4
 
As measures of agricultural technology (A) we use the existence of technical or semi-technical 
irrigation systems (usually village schemes), the construction of terraces as well as the use of 
fertilizer, pesticides, and improved seeds in the villages. Irrigation systems are only reported 
for villages with sawah rice fields. This concerns 70 out of the 77 villages and only those are 
included in the respective regressions. Likewise, terraces are only relevant for villages which 
have fields on steep slopes. This concerns 46 out of the 77 villages and again only those are 
included in the relevant regressions. One should also note that irrigation and terraces are 
rather long term investments, whereas fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds are short term 
investments. For the latter land rights matter if land can be used as collateral for credit. In the 
study region this is the case and credits are an important device to finance inputs such as 
fertilizer in the pre-harvest period. 
 
The vector X stands for additional control variables such as the male per agricultural land 
ratio in the village, the share of the village population between 19 and 45 years old and 
whether the village had connection to drinking water in 1990. We also control for adult 
education, which we measure by a dummy variable indicating whether the village had a 
primary school in 1980.
5  
 
In the basic specification the dependant variable is measured in 2001 and all explanatory 
variables, including technology, in the mid-nineties to allow for a time lag until these 
investments translate into higher incomes. Given that we have for most of our variables also 
retrospective information, we estimate Equation (1a) also with a panel fixed-effects estimator 
to control for all time-invariant unobserved village effects: 
 
                                                 
4 It should also be noted that stones and bricks are often made or collected in the surroundings of the villages and 
hence, no road is necessary to bring them. Also, heavy materials including stones are in the Lore Lindu region 
traditionally and still frequently transported using buffalos, donkeys, horses or motorcycles. Given that labor is 
very cheap, transport time plays no important role. In 2001, among the 15 villages without any stone house, 11 
are not accessible by car and 4 are accessible. Conversely, 8 villages among the 19 villages which are not 
accessible by car, have a significant share of stone houses. 
5 We also used a few other control variables but they did not change the results. Due to the relatively small 
sample size, we cannot include a large set of control variables in a single estimation. 
  8it it it i it X A Y ε γ α µ + + + =
' ' . (1b) 
 
At this stage, we do not address the issue of a possible simultaneity bias of technology and 
income, but we will return to this issue below.  In general, we are, however, less interested in 
producing a precise unbiased estimate of the impact of agricultural technology on incomes 
than in understanding the process of endogenous technological change itself.
6  
 
To identify the drivers of technology adoption and to test for the hypothesis we developed in 
Section 2, we estimate then step by step the impact of geography on migration, the impact of 
migration on land rights and the impact of land rights on technology. At the end we also 
estimate all equations as a simultaneous equation system. 
 
The causal impact of geography on migration is tested by estimating the following equation: 
 
Ii I i I i I i X G M υ γ β λ + + + =
' ' , (2) 
 
Migration (M) is measured alternatively through two variables: first through the net 
immigration rate to each village over the period 1980 to 1990 and, second, through the 
logarithm of village population size in 1980. The former is measured as the difference of 
immigrating and emigrating households over a given period divided by the number of 
households in the village at the beginning of that period. It should be noted that we take here 
the household as the observation unit and not the individual, since rural-rural migration is in 
this context usually household migration. Village population size in 1980 is used as a proxy 
for immigration prior to 1980, but of course it includes past natural population growth as well. 
However, the latter should vary much less over the villages in the Lore Lindu region than 
migration. Therefore, we are confident that we capture with this variable reasonably well the 
effect of migration. As an additional regressor in the net-migration rate equation we use the 
population density in each village (population divided by total land area, excluding forest) in 
1980 to control for the possibility that denser villages attract more or less migrants. Finally we 
control whether the village had a connection to drinking water and to electricity in 1980. Both 
might have an impact on immigration rates. 
 
As measures of the geographic features of the villages (G) we use the share of agricultural 
land which is on steep slopes,
7 the year of the last drought as a measure of the frequency of 
droughts, the logarithm of the village altitude above sea level in meters and whether the 
village was accessible by car in 1980.  
 
The accessibility by car variable is not intended to measure current infrastructure access. By 
using historical road access, it is rather included as a measure of geographical remoteness and 
as a measure of geographic traits which make the construction of a road more or less easy.
8 
The first roads in Central Sulawesi can be traced back to the colonial period and were indeed 
built where geography made it easy. Roads through rougher areas as for example the road to 
Barisi in the South-East of the Lore-Lindu region were built after 1980. In our dataset, 
accessibility by car in 1980 is negatively correlated with the share of agricultural land on 
steep slopes (correlation coefficient: -0.25), this also supports the view that this variable is a 
good measure of geography. 
                                                 
6 The problem is also partly mitigated by using lagged technology in the income regression. 
7 A slope of more than 30° is considered as ‘steep’. 
8 Given the long time lag of this variable and the significant changes in accessibility over time, this variable 
should be relatively independent from accessibility by car today. 
  9 
Regarding the share of agriculture land on steep slopes one may argue that it is not relevant as 
long as the total land size is very large. However, we argue that this variable is a good 
measure of geography, since we look only at agricultural land. If enough land in the plain 
were available villagers would not convert land on steep slopes to agricultural land, given that 
it needs much more time to be cultivated and irrigated. One may also question the exogeneity 
of our “share of agricultural land on steep slopes” variable. One may argue that immigration 
and economic expansion leads to the conversion of land which is more difficult to cultivate 
than existing land. We checked this hypothesis by comparing villages where expansion of 
land was still possible in 1990 and 2001 with villages where expansion was still possible on 
1990 but not in 2001. Obviously, in the latter villages (10 villages) conversion has taken 
place. However, in these villages the share of agricultural land on steep slopes was not 
significantly different from the share observed in the other villages. 
 
To show that migration enhances land titling, we estimate the following equation: 
 
Ri R i i R R i X M R υ γ β λ + + + =
' , (3a) 
 
where R is a dichotomous variable which takes the value one if legal government titles for 
land exist in village i. Control variables included in X are adult education and the availability 
of a credit program in the village during the past twenty years. Higher adult education might 
facilitate the village action needed to submit a proposal for land titling. The availability of a 
credit program might increase the demand for land titling such that land can be used as 
collateral. It should be noted that in all equations above and in those which follow, we operate 
with appropriate time lags that is we use migration prior to land titling, and land titling prior 
to technology adoption.  
 
To control for village specific time invariant effects, we estimate Equation (3a) also with a 
panel fixed-effects estimator: 
 
Rit R it it R Ri it X M R υ γ β λ + + + =
' . (3b) 
 
Moreover, in line with our hypothesis formulated in Section 2, we are interested to see 
whether geography-induced migration makes land rights more likely. Therefore we re-
estimate Equation (3a) using 2SLS and instrument migration with geography: 
 




Ri R i i R R i X M R υ γ β λ + + + =
' ˆ       with       . (3c)  2
'
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
I i I i G M π π + =
 
The last element in our causal chain is the hypothesized positive impact of land rights on 
technology adoption. We estimate the following equation: 
 
Ai A i i A A i X R A υ γ β λ + + + =
' , (4a) 
 
where A stands for the same technology variables than in Equation (1). Again we estimate this 
equation also with a fixed-effects estimator: 
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'  (4b) 
 
and with 2SLS where we instrument land rights by migration: 
 
Ri i R R i M R ω π π + + = 2 1  
and 
Ai A i i A A i X R A υ γ β λ + + + =
' ˆ       with        (4c)  i R R i M R 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ π π + =
 
Finally we combine IV with fixed-effects given that we have for all variables including the 
instruments multiple observations over time: 
 
Rit it R R it M R ω π π + + = 2 1  
and 
Ait A it it A Ai it X R A υ γ β λ + + + =
' ˆ       with       . (4d)  it R i R it M R 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ π π + =
 
An obvious way to complete the above analysis is to estimate the Equations (2), (3a) and (4a) 
as a simultaneous equation system using 3SLS and to check whether the effects identified in 
the estimation step-by-step still hold. That is what we do at the end of our empirical analysis. 
 
Then, in principle a further and final step could be, in line with the more macro-economic 
literature, to test whether geography has any impact on income once its effect through 
migration, land rights and technology is accounted for. Although, below we will briefly 
discuss results from such estimations, we will focus more on the transmission mechanism and 
are less interested in a precise estimation of the impact of agricultural technology on rural 
growth. 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all key and the principal control variables in our 
analysis. As the statistics show, migration, land rights and technology adoption show a sizable 
variation across villages and over time. Both should help to identify the parameters we are 
interested in. This spatial and intertemporal variation also shows that our region of analysis is 
a region under substantial transformation.   
 





5.1. Technology and economic development 
Table 2 reports regressions of Equation (1a), i.e. of the share of houses built from stone, 
bricks or cement, our measure of economic development, on various variables of agricultural 
technology. 
 
[Please insert Table 2] 
 
Columns (1)–(5) show that all used technology variables have a positive and highly 
significant impact on economic performance. Note that technology is measured in 1995 and 
the share of houses in 2001, taking into account the time it takes until new technologies can 
translate into durably higher incomes. Column (6) shows a regression in which we use 
  11irrigation and a dummy variable as technology variables - the latter taking the value one if the 
village used fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds simultaneously
9 - and, as an additional 
control variable, the average share of households who emigrated from the village between 
1995 and 2001. This latter variable is insignificant and thus makes it unlikely that the share of 
stone houses is strongly related to remittances coming from former villagers who migrated to 
the city.  
 
Column (7) introduces as additional controls the ratio between the male population and the 
total size of agricultural land in 1995, the share of villagers between 19 and 45 years old, 
adult education approximated by the availability of a primary school in the village in 1980, 
and a dummy variable whether the village had in 1990 a drinking water system. Using the 
results of that regression we find that on average in a village with irrigation the share of stone 
houses is higher by almost 20 percentage points than in a village without irrigation. Using 
fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds simultaneously increases this share again by 23 
percentage points. This model explains more than 62% of the total variance in the data. We 
also estimated the models presented in columns (1)-(7) with maximum likelihood using a 
generalized linear model which might be more appropriate given that our dependant variable 
is a ratio bounded between 0 and 1. It turned out that the standard errors were nearly identical 
and hence we decided to stick to the simpler OLS model. 
 
Given the relatively small sample size we are of course constrained by the number of control 
variables we can introduce in the model. However, given that we have for the relevant 
variables observations over at least four different points in time (usually 1980, 1990, 1995 and 
2001), we can estimate our model also using fixed effects as specified in Equation (1b) and 
thus at least control for the influence of all time-invariant village effects. Columns (8)–(13) 
show that all results hold and that most of the technology coefficients have a similar 
magnitude.  
 
As a further robustness test, in Table A1 in the Appendix we present regressions in which we 
use as a dependent variable, instead of the level, the average yearly absolute growth of the 
share of stone houses observed over three alternative periods. All effects hold, i.e. the villages 
where modern technologies where already used in the beginning of the period, show 
subsequently higher growth rates. We also tested whether the initial share of stone houses has 
any impact to capture a possible ‘conditional convergence’ effect, but this variable was not 
significant in any of these regressions. 
 
Of course all these results might be affected by a possible endogeneity of technology to 
income, although we mitigate this problem by using appropriate lags. In principle proper 
instruments are needed to solve the endogeneity problem satisfactory. We discuss this 
possibility below. In fact, we are not interested in generating a precise point estimate of the 
effect of technology on development. At this stage of the analysis we simply conclude, as 
many other empirical studies have done before, that agricultural technology enhances rural 
development. This motivates us to look now at the determinants of technology adoption. We 
will show that technology is driven by migration-induced land rights. 
 
                                                 
9 Note that these techniques are often adopted in a sequence, starting with irrigation, followed first by fertilizer, 
second by pesticides and last by improved seeds. 
 
  125.2 The transmission channel from geography to technological change 
As discussed in our theoretical part, we assume that technology can be traced back to 
geography, migration and land rights. Table 3 shows the results we obtain if we regress, 
according to Equation (2), migration on our four geographic variables. As mentioned above, 
migration is captured alternatively through two variables: first through the net immigration 
rate to each village over the period 1980 to 1990 and, second, through village population size 
in 1980. The latter is used as a proxy for settlements and immigration prior to 1980. 
 
Regressions (1)-(4) in Table 3 show the effect of each single geographic variable on the net 
immigration rate at the destination. We control for population density in 1980. The 
regressions show that all geographic variables, except village altitude, have a significant 
impact on migration. The signs are always as expected. This also holds if we control for 
infrastructure in 1980, such as the availability of a drinking water system and electricity 
supply, which are both not significant (column (5)). An increase of the share of fields on steep 
slopes by 10 percentage points increases the net immigration rate by 1.2 percentage point. 
This seems to be a reasonable order of magnitude. If we use all geographic variables together 
only the share of agricultural land on steep slopes comes out as significant (column (6)). As 
columns (7)-(11) show, migration prior to 1980 seems in particular to be related to village 
altitude and to accessibility by car in 1980, which, again, we use as a measure of landform. It 
should be emphasized that these results are not affected by transmigration programs, since we 
excluded from our analysis, as mentioned above, the three villages which received immigrants 
through these programs during the observation period. 
 
[Please insert Table 3] 
 
In a next step we first analyze using Equation (3a) whether, according to our hypothesis, 
migration has an impact on land rights. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4 show that this is the case, 
whether we use only the two migration variables, whether we estimate the model with a linear 
probability model or a non-linear model and whether we include additional controls, such as 
our proxy for adult education and the availability of any credit program (governmental or not) 
in the village during the past 20 years. The results imply that an increase in the immigration 
rate between 1980 and 1990 by 10% is associated with an increase in the probability of 
having land rights in the village by 1990 by 9.4%. An increase in the village population size 
in 1980 by 1% is in turn associated with 0.3% higher probability of having land rights in the 
village. The model explains almost 32% of the total variance in the data. Here again, we can 
estimate the same model with village fixed effects, as specified in Equation (3b). The results 
are shown in column (4). With respect to the OLS estimation the size of the coefficients 
changes a bit, but the signs remain the same and both coefficients of interest are significant. 
However, while this equation controls for all village-specific time-invariant determinants, we 
are not able to include due to data limits credit or adult education as time-variant control 
variables.  
 
[Please insert Table 4] 
 
An implication of our theory is that geography should be a relevant instrument for migration. 
Geography should also be exogenous to land rights. Hence, we present in columns (5)-(7) 
2SLS regressions as specified in Equation (3c), where we instrument migration through 
geography in the land rights equation. The relevant F-test for the instrumentation of the 
migration rate is not above ten; hence we cannot be sure that the instrument is strong enough. 
However, if we instrument population size in 1980 by geography the test statistic is very 
  13satisfying. The over-identification tests give us confidence that our instruments are indeed 
exogenous. 
 
To further underpin the causal direction from migration to land rights, we also estimate for 
different periods the reverse relationship, i.e. the impact of land rights on migration. In this 
case we use land rights status at the beginning of the period over which migration is observed. 
The results are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. All regressions show, whether we take 
the absolute or the net immigration rate, whether we look at the eighties or the nineties and 
whether we add further controls or not, land rights have never a significant impact on 
migration in the subsequent period. Hence, we conclude that migration and the induced 
population pressure on land resources enhance land rights and not the other way around. 
 
The anecdotal evidence also supports the chain of causation we just examined. Villagers told 
us that prospective migrants looking for better living conditions select their destination 
according to geographic characteristics which are a priori favorable for agricultural 
productivity. In most cases migrants then buy or simply get land or a piece of forest to clear 
from the village leader. If this happens too frequently local villagers feel disadvantaged, 
possibly fear expropriation, also claim additional land or believe that the land given to the 
migrants belonged to them. This eventually initiates the process of land titling. Some villagers 
also reported that migrants come with forged land rights ‘bought’ from some higher ‘state 
authority’ and get possibly some land by bribing a local village leader. Again, such a process 
leads communities to demand land security and leads to a demand-driven implementation of 
land rights. 
 
Now we deal with the question whether land rights enhance agricultural investment. The 
results are presented in Table 5. The coefficients in columns (1)-(5) which are obtained by 
estimating Equation (4a) show that land rights in 1990 have a significant and positive impact 
on all technologies we consider. The impact is the highest in the case of irrigation systems, 
which is on average probably the most costly investment and with the construction of terraces 
the only long term investment we look at. The existence of land rights increases the 
probability of investing in an irrigation system by roughly 45%. The impact of land rights on 
the probabilities of finding one of the other investments is between 30% and 40%. We obtain 
similar results when we use a probit model for estimation (columns (6)-(8)) or when we add 
further control variables, such as our proxy for adult education, the availability of any credit 
program (governmental or not) in the village during the past 10 years or whether one can buy 
in the village any newspaper (columns (9)-(11)). The results do also not change if we define 




[Please insert Table 5] 
 
In principle many villages have today some support by governmental or non-governmental 
extension workers which might also play a role in promoting technological progress. Our data 
do not contain any information when these workers came for the first time to the village.   But 
anecdotal evidence suggests that extension work is rather a demand and not a supply driven 
process.
11 If we regress technology on land rights and add as a regressor the presence of an 
                                                 
10 These results are not shown in Table 5, but can be obtained on request by the authors. 
11Villagers report that these workers, although they are quite well trained, are only rarely able to transmit their 
knowledge. Usually these workers do not have a car or motorbike to reach the villages and dispose of almost no 
technical equipment and training material. Hence, the real impact of these workers in the Lore Lindu region is in 
  14extension worker today (columns (12)-(14)), the effects of land rights on technology adoption 
hold and the coefficient of the extension worker variable is insignificant except for fertilizer 
use, without however in this case changing very much the coefficient of the land rights 
variable.  
 
The effect of land rights on technology adoption does also hold if we use a fixed-effect 
estimator (Equation (4b)) and thus control again for all time invariant village effects. 
Although as columns (15)-(17) show the coefficients of land rights are a bit smaller than with 
the OLS estimator, they remain all significant.  
 
Columns (18)-(23) show estimations as specified in Equation (4c) where we instrument land 
rights in 1990 with the net migration rate during the period 1980-1990 and the village 
population size in 1980. In all regressions the effect of land rights persists. The first stage 
regressions all have an F-statistic well above ten and the second stage regressions always pass 
the over-identification test. The effect does also hold if we combine the instrumental variable 
approach with the fixed-effect estimator (Equation (4d)). The results are shown in columns 
(24)-(26). Again, all relevant test-statistics are satisfactory.
12  
 
Our hypothesis can also be formulated as a simultaneous equation system comprising two 
equations for geography-induced migration, one equation for migration-induced land rights 
and one equation for land rights-induced technology. Table 6 shows the results. We use three 
different technology variables, irrigation, simultaneous use of fertilizer, pesticides and 
improved seeds and the construction of terraces. All results are qualitatively consistent with 
the results above and support our line of reasoning, although the coefficients vary in size 
which is due to the relative small sample size we have to rely on to identify this system of 
equations. 
 
[Please insert Table 6] 
 
One might argue that migration has a direct (and not indirect) impact on technology adoption. 
Such a link could exist if migrants bring new technologies to the villages. For example, there 
is some evidence that Bugis (or Buginese, an ethnically Malay, nomadic tribe from the south-
western ‘leg’ of Sulawesi) are well experienced in growing coffee. While we do not deny this 
link — in fact it is complementary to our approach — we claim that this is not the dominating 
force. We tested this link also empirically by estimating a regression of technology use in 
1995 on the net migration rate between 1980 and 1990. The results are shown in Table A3 in 
the Appendix. It turns out that the migration rate is never significant in these regressions.  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
As we argued in the beginning of our paper there is considerable debate about the main 
drivers of technological change in a poor rural economy. The literature emphasizes among 
other things geography, population pressure and institutional change as the important 
determinants without however establishing links between these factors. Our hypothesis was 
that a favorable geography, such as easily cultivable land and a low frequency of droughts 
                                                                                                                                                          
most cases, according to the villagers, very limited, or needs at least explicit village action to bring these workers 
to the village. 
12 Only in the case of terraces building the coefficient takes an unrealistic value, but one should note that terraces 
building concerns only the smaller sample with fields on steep slopes and therefore the estimates are definitely 
less precise. 
  15attract migration, which in turn creates pressure on land. This provides an incentive for 
villagers and village leaders to opt for land rights which in turn provide an incentive to invest 
in agricultural technology. We tested this hypothesis empirically using data on villages 
situated on the Indonesian Island Sulawesi. Employing a system of nested equations and 
controlling for potential endogeneity problems and unobserved heterogeneity, we found 
strong empirical support for our hypothesis. We think this finding has at least three important 
implications. 
 
First, at least in this context, land rights have a significant and positive impact on agricultural 
investment, even if we control for their endogeneity. This positive impact which is at odds in 
particular with the results from many studies on Africa, as discussed in Section 2, might be 
attributable to two aspects: (i) The existence of the necessary pre-conditions which allow to 
make use of the potential functions of land rights such as using land as collateral; (ii) the fact 
that land rights are in our context demand driven and not enforced from some higher state 
authority. Put differently in our context, the process of land titling is endogenous and 
therefore land rights are more likely to develop their potential favorable effects.  
 
Second, the transmission channel we identify in our analysis is similar to the one emphasized 
by Boserup (1981), but extends it in the sense that we show that the effect from population on 
technology is not direct, but acts through its effect on the implementation of land rights, 
which is endogenous in this process. Hence, we provide a link between Boserupian theory and 
the theory of institutional change as formulated by North (1987) and Hayami and Ruttan 
(1985).  
 
Third, we complement the more macro-economic literature, which puts forward the role of 
institutions for the explanation of long run differences in economic development, in 
highlighting one possible channel which may underlie the institutions hypothesis. If we 
wanted to follow this literature even more closely, i.e. not only providing an argument for the 
institutions hypothesis, but also rejecting the geography hypothesis, we would have to 
instrument technology through geography. With this instrumentation we would then have to 
show that geography has no direct impact on development once its indirect impact via 
institutions is accounted for. While we can indeed show that geography-induced technology 
drives development, we do not have a geographic instrument at hand of which we can be sure 
that it drives migration, but has no direct impact on development, i.e. an instrument which 
satisfies convincingly the necessary exclusion restriction.
13 Acemoglu et al. (2001) use, as 
mentioned above, settler mortality, which was, so the argument, mainly driven by malaria and 
yellow fever diseases which had only a limited effect on indigenous adults and thus it can 
reasonably be assumed that settler mortality has no direct impact on economic performance 
today.  
 
However, we think that the microeconomic mechanism we have identified might be an 
important part of the link between institutions and development identified by the cross-
country literature. Acemoglu et al. (2001) use the ‘Average protection against expropriation 
risk index’ and expects that a high value of this index is associated with “the tradition of rule 
                                                 
13 In fact using our data, we can show that (i) geography is correlated with the share of stone houses, (ii) that 
geography is a relevant instrument for technology, (iii) geography-induced technology has a significant impact 
on the share of stone houses with technology coefficients slightly higher than under OLS, and (iv) geography has 
no direct impact on the share of stone houses once its impact through technology is accounted for. In the latter 
case, we use a sub-set of our geographic variables as instrumental variables (excluded from the main equation) 
and add one or several alternative geographic variables in the main equation. However, as emphasized above, 
this test is not sufficient to claim that geography has no direct impact at all.  All results are available on request. 
  16of law and well-enforced property rights” (p. 1378). In this sense we use in our study a notion 
of institutions which is very close to the one in mind by Acemoglu et al. (2001).  In fact, one 
natural extension of our work would be to look at land rights as a critical institution that 
affected economic performance in settler versus non-settler colonies and under different 
colonial regimes.   
 
For the reasons given, we will not reject the geography hypothesis per se, but think that the 
channel from geography to migration, land rights, technology and development we have 
shown is the dominating force, that is this channel is much more important than the possible 
direct impact of geography. For our study context it would imply that geography might matter 
for agricultural development but that good institutions and in particular well defined and 
secure land property rights and investment in modern technology can easily compensate 
geographic disadvantages. Moreover if geography is favorable, land rights arise 
endogenously. If in contrast geographic conditions are unfavorable there is room for policy to 
initiate the process exogenously. 
 
However, regarding the villages we observed, it should be noted that this process of 
endogenous land rights has mixed effects on the local population and on rainforest 
conversion.  While many villagers appear to benefit from the intensification and technological 
change that the land rights have helped bring about, some villagers are marginalized in the 
process.  In our study region, it was reported that some villagers behave myopically when 
land markets arise. They sell land to migrants to make fast money. The land is usually fallow 
land, which has been kept, e.g. as reserve for heritage. Later, they recognize their mistake, but 
there is no more free land available. This process leads in some villages to a marginalization 
of local inhabitants relative to migrants and also accelerates deforestation (Faust et al., 2003; 
Weber and Faust, 2006).  Regarding rainforest conversion, it appears that agricultural 
intensification not only promotes income growth at the rainforest margin but also reduces 
conversion so that promotion of land rights not only increases incomes but also helps stabilize 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of used variables 
 
       
  Invariant  1980 1990 1995 2001 
Development        
Share of houses built from stone    0.054  0.125  0.214  0.317 
    (0.107) (0.180) (0.235) (0.303) 
        
Geography        
Share of agr. land on steep slopes  0.156         
  (0.259)      
Number of years to last drought  9.299         
  (10.664)      
Village accessible by car    0.597 0.714 0.727 0.753 
Altitude in m (level above sea)  647.3         
  (339.9)      
        
Demography        
Net immigration rate of housh.
a)  0.021  0.021  0.014   
   (0.131)  (0.066)  (0.100)   
Village population size    713.5  913.8  987.2  1101.9 
    (694.1) (821.1) (857.3) (876.4) 
        
Land rights    0.091 0.351 0.403 0.636 
        
Technology use        
Irrigation system available
 b)   0.200 0.329 0.371 0.514 
Fertilizer  use    0.403 0.584 0.649 0.727 
Pesticides  use    0.455 0.636 0.753 0.948 
Improved  seeds  use    0.286 0.416 0.545 0.870 
Terraces building
 c)   0.065 0.217 0.283 0.523 
        
Other control variables        
Male population per ha land      0.971  1.053   
     (0.583)  (0.636)   
Share of population 19-45 years          0.380 
         (0.088) 
Population density (pop per ha)    1.205  1.484  1.652  1.829 
    (0.919) (1.041) (1.173) (1.187) 
Primary school in village    0.857  0.961    0.987 
Newspaper in village          0.052 
Drinking water connection     0.416  0.455    0.896 
Electricity connection    0.104  0.247    0.922 
Doctor available    0.169  0.338    0.442 
Credit available
 d).  0.901  0.922    0.909 
        
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Standard deviations in parentheses where appropriate. 
2. 
a) The net immigration rate relates to the periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2001. 
3. 
b) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice (mean computed over 
those villages, i.e. 70 out of 77). 
4. 
c) Terraces are only relevant for villages with steep slopes (mean computed over those villages, i.e. 46 
out of 77). 
5. 
d) The ‘credit available’ variable is here shown for the periods ‘past 20 years’, ‘past 10 years’ and in 
2001.  
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The effect of technology on development 
OLS and FE regressions 
 
   
  OLS regressions. Dependent Variable: Share of stone houses in 2001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Irrigation  0.379      0.303  0.191 
1995
 a) (0.066)***      (0.097)***  (0.069)*** 
Fertilizer    0.395         
1995    (0.046)***        
Pesticides     0.313       
1995     (0.050)***        
Improved      0.304      
seeds  1995      (0.060)***      
F.,  P.  &  S.        0.204  0.234 
1995
 c)       (0.097)**  (0.069)*** 
Terraces      0.265     
1995
 b)      (0.087)***     
Emigration        0.364   
1990-2001       (1.463)   
Male  pop.         0.039 
per  ha.  1995          (0.027) 
Population         0.361 
share  19-45          (0.261) 
Prim.  school         0.080 
1980          (0.083) 
Drink.  water         0.171 
conn.  1990          (0.060)*** 
Constant  0.185 0.062 0.082 0.149 0.194  0.101  -0.181 
  (0.036)*** (0.022)*** (0.028)*** (0.038)*** (0.044)***  (0.045)***  (0.147) 
R
2 0.356 0.394 0.204 0.252 0.185  0.536  0.620 
N  70 77 77 77 46  46  70 
           
FE regressions. Dependent Variable: Share of stone houses
 d)
  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13)   
Irrigation
 a) 0.190      0.143   
  (0.031)***      (0.127)***   
Fertilizer    0.139        
    (0.026)***         
Pesticides     0.097        
     (0.018)***        
Improved     0.145       
seeds      (0.019)***       
F.,  P.  &  S.         0.127   
         (0.029)***   
Terraces
 b)     0.072  0.040   
       (0.013)***  (0.016)**   
R
2 0.238 0.256 0.167 0.236 0.076  0.425   
N  280 308 308 308 184  160   
           
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice. 
4. 
b) Terraces are only relevant for villages with steep slopes. 
5. 
c) ‘F., P. & S.’ stands for the simultaneous use of fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds. 
6. 
d) In the FE regressions stone houses and technology in 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2001 are used. 
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  Dependent Variable: Net immigration rate of households between 1980 and 1990 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share  steep  -0.114     -0.114  -0.124 
slopes  (0.058)*     (0.063)*  (0.060)** 
Years  to  last    0.002    0.002  
drought    (0.001)*    (0.001)  
Ln  altitude     0.004   0.024   
above  sea     (0.011)   (0.021)   
Access.  by       0.059 0.045   
car in 1980        (0.032)*  (0.038)   
Pop.  density  -0.006 -0.004  0.000 -0.011 -0.002 -0.007 
1980  (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.019 (0.017) 
Drink.  water        -0.026 
conn.  1990        (0.032) 
Electricity        0.068 
conn.  1990        (0.049) 
Constant  0.047  0.009 -0.008 -0.001    0.053 
  (0.028)* (0.039) (0.073) (0.029)    (0.030)* 
R
2 0.053 0.020 0.001 0.048 0.111 0.087 
N  77 77 77 77 77 77 
        
Dependent Variable: Ln village population size in 1980 
  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)   
Share  steep  -0.268     0.166  
slopes  (0.339)     (0.313)  
Years  to  last    0.003    -0.004  
drought    (0.008)    (0.007)  
Ln  altitude     -0.470   -0.382   
above  sea     (0.089)***   (0.099)***   
Access.  by       0.668 0.392   
car in 1980        (0.163)***  (0.186)**   
Constant  6.335 6.267 9.230 5.891 8.457   
  (0.103)*** (0.118)*** (0.556)*** (0.126)*** (0.677)***   
R
2 0.009 0.001 0.286 0.188 0.331   
N  77 77 77 77 77   
         
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
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The effect of migration on land rights 
OLS, Probit, FE and IV regressions 
 
  
  Dependent variable 
  Land rights in 1990  Land rights
. Land rights in 1990 











  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Immigration 0.988  4.003 0.936  0.584  0.590 2.296   
(1980-1990)  (0.334)*** (1.664)** (0.353)** (0.280)** (1.820) (1.411)*   
Ln pop.  0.304  1.019  0.314  0.596  0.369  0.421  0.455 
(1980)  (0.055)*** (0.278)*** (0.059)*** (0.144)*** (0.111)*** (0.097)*** (0.094)*** 
Prim. school      -0.165    -0.235  -0.160  -0.320 
1980     (0.125)    (0.153) (0.146) (0.108)*** 
Credit avail.      0.143    0.101  0.115  0.060 
past 20 y.     (0.180)    (0.178) (0.197) (0.176) 
Constant -1.564  -6.973  -1.613  -3.471 -1.875  -2.309 -2.300 
  (0.338)*** (1.799)*** (0.374)*** (0.958)*** (0.672)*** (0.589)*** (0.555)*** 
R
2 0.295  0.316  0.185       
N  77 77 77 231 77 77 77 
              
         First-stage regression: Migration
 b)
Share steep          -0.112  -0.102   
slopes         (0.089)  (0.080)   
Years to last            0.002   
drought           (0.001)   
Ln altitude          0.009  0.022   
above sea          (0.016)  (0.019)   
Access. by            0.053   
car in 1980            (0.045)   
F-Stat.         0.8  1.3   
            
        First-stage regression: Ln pop 1980
 b)
Share steep          -0.051  0.171  0.165 
slopes         (0.411)  (0.380)  (0.376) 
Years to last            -0.003  -0.003 
drought           (0.008)  (0.008) 
Ln altitude          -0.454  -0.363  -0.362 
above sea          (0.096)***  (0.113)***  (0.113)*** 
Access. by            0.473  0.469 
car in 1980            (0.215)**  (0.212)** 
F-Stat.         13.1  10.1  10.3 
            
Hansen J p          0.145 
            
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) In the FE regressions land rights status and population in 1990, 1995 and 2001 are used. The net 
migration rate relates to the periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2001. 
4. 
b) Only the coefficients of the excluded instruments are presented. 
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The effect of land rights on technology  
OLS, Probit, FE, IV and FE-IV regressions 
 
 
Dependant variables: Technology use in 1995 
  OLS regression  Probit regression 
  Irrigation
a) Fertilizer Pesticides  Imp.  Seed.  Terraces
b) Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Land  rights  0.445 0.369 0.323 0.244 0.294  1.205  1.170 
1990 (0.114)***  (0.094)***  (0.078)***  (0.114)** (0.164)*  (0.335)***  (0.368)*** 
Constant  0.209 0.520 0.640 0.460 0.206  -0.809  0.050 
  (0.063)*** (0.072)*** (0.069)*** (0.071)*** (0.071)***  (0.217)***  (0.178) 
R
2 0.198 0.136 0.128 0.055 0.082     
N  70 77 77 77 46  70 77 
           
  Dependant variables: Technology use in 1995  Dep. Variables: Technology use in 
2001 
  Probit  OLS regression  OLS regression 
  Terraces
 b) Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer Terraces
 b) Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer  Terraces
 b)
  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) (13)  (14) 
Land  rights  0.821 0.376 0.322 0.274 0.309  0.321  0.293 
1990 (0.441)*  (0.116)***  (0.093)***  (0.187) (0.133)** (0.110)*** (0.172)* 
Prim.  School   0.119  -0.059 0.049       
1980   (0.145) (0.139) (0.184)       
Credit avail.    0.317  0.438  0.231       
past 10 y.    (0.093)***  (0.188)**  (0.086)**       
Newspaper   0.463  0.207  -0.005       
available   (0.121)***  (0.095)**  (0.411)       
Extension w.          0.224  0.270  0.023 
2001         (0.136)  (0.117)**  (0.180) 
Constant  -0.821 -0.182  0.172 -0.049    0.320 0.340 
  (0.246) (0.155) (0.225) (0.184)    (0.098)***  (0.130)** 
R
2  0.291  0.211  0.098  0.157  0.258  0.091 
N  46 70 77 46 70  77 46 
 
 
Table 5 continues on next page.  
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The effect of land rights on technology  
OLS, Probit, FE, IV and FE-IV regressions 
 
 
  Dependant variables: Technology use  Dependant variables: Technology use in 1995 
  FE regressions




 a) Fertilizer Terraces
 b)
  (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Land  rights  0.249 0.208 0.957 0.817 0.824 0.692 
(1990)
. (0.057)*** (0.051)*** (0.128)*** (0.170)*** (0.200)*** (0.214)*** 
Constant  0.262 0.514 0.215 0.071 0.334 0.082 
 (0.029)***  (0.027)***  (0.053)*** (0.084)  (0.107)*** (0.055) 
R
2 0.177 0.176 0.090       
N  280 308 184  70  77  46 
        
       First-stage regression: Land rights
 e)
Immigration       0.943 0.988 0.617 
1980-1990       (0.359)**  (0.334)*** (0.329)** 
Ln  pop.       0.307 0.304 0.360 
1980       (0.057)*** (0.055)*** (0.054)*** 
F-Stat.       17.7 19.6 24.4 
Hansen J p       0.342 0.391 0.936 
        
 
  Dependant variables: Technology use in 1995  Dependant variables: Technology use 
  IV regressions  FE-IV regressions
 d)
  Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer Terraces
 b) Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer Terraces
 b)
  (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
Land  rights  0.659 0.795 0.815 0.379 0.568 4.193 
(1990) (0.182)***  (0.216)*** (0.234)  (0.201)* (0.193)*** (0.951)*** 
Prim.  school  0.108  0.067  0.028    
1980  (0.174)  (0.142)  (0.094)    
Credit  avail.  0.259  0.346  0.074    
past  10  y.  (0.125)**  (0.237)  (0.062)    
Newspaper  0.357  0.024  -0.389    
available  (0.176)**  (0.197)  (0.428)    
Constant  -0.218  -0.033  -0.028 0.205 0.371  -1.372 
 (0.205)  (0.250)  (0.094)  (0.102)** (0.098)*** (0.484)*** 
N  70  77  46 210 231 138 
        
  First-stage regression: Land rights
 e)
Immigration  0.906 0.944 0.574 0.584 0.584 0.584 
1980-1990 (0.383)**  (0.362)**  (0.352) (0.280)** (0.280)** (0.280)** 
Ln  pop.  0.325 0.320 0.350 0.596 0.596 0.596 
1980 (0.070)***  (0.068)***  (0.066)*** (0.144)*** (0.144)*** (0.144)*** 
F-Stat.  13.1 14.9 15.1 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Hansen J p  0.455  0.461  0.962    
        
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice. 
4. 
b) Terraces are only relevant for villages with steep slopes. 
5. 
c) In the FE regressions technology and land rights status in 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2001 are used. 
6. 
d) In the FE-IV regressions technology, land rights status and population in 1990, 1995 and 2001 are 
used. The net migration rate relates to the periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2001. 
7. 
e) Only the coefficients of the excluded instruments are presented. 
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Migration, Land rights and Technology,  
Simultaneous Equation system 
 
   
  Dependant variables: Technology use in 1995 
  Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer Terraces
 b)
  (1) (2) (3) 
Technology     
Land rights 1995  1.164  1.287  0.867 
  (0.258)*** (0.268)*** (0.294)*** 
Primary school 1980  0.219  0.329  -0.029 
 (0.178)  (0.195)*  (0.233) 
Credit available past   0.125  0.083  0.056 
10  years  (0.217) (0.236) (0.277) 
Newspaper  available  0.115 -0.092 -0.420 
  (0.220) (0.231) (0.342) 
Constant -0.355  -0.318  0.008 
  (0.275) (0.303) (0.346) 
Land rights 1990      
Immigration  rate  1.267 1.638 2.076 
1980-1990 (0.918)  (0.950)*  (0.942)** 
Ln population 1980  0.438  0.430  0.532 
  (0.097)*** (0.100)*** (0.114)*** 
Primary school 1980  -0.214  0.010  -0.074 
  (0.152) (0.167) (0.197) 
Credit available  0.042  -0.214  0.254 
past  20  years  (0.169) (0.153) (0.203) 
Constant  -2.286 -2.211 -3.209 
 (0.586)***  (0.601)***  (0.700) 
Immigration 1980-1990     
Share of fields on   -0.121  -0.065  -0.113 
steep  slopes  (0.063)* (0.052) (0.073) 
Number of years to   0.002  0.003  0.003 
last drought  (0.001)*  (0.001)**  (0.002)* 
Ln  altitude  0.018 0.013 0.026 
above  sea  (0.020) (0.018) (0.036) 
Access.  by  0.052 0.052 0.026 
car in 1980  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.048) 
Population -0.010  -0.012  0.006 
density  1980  (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) 
Constant  -0.107 -0.098 -0.179 
  (0.140) (0.124) (0.248) 
Ln population 1980      
Share of fields on   0.108  0.262  0.539 
steep slopes  (0.336)  (0.300)  (0.328)* 
Number of years to   -0.001  -0.002  -0.012 
last  drought  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Ln  altitude  -0.433 -0.393 -0.323 
above sea  (0.099)***  (0.095)***  (0.153)** 
Access.  by  0.363 0.404 0.530 
car in 1980  (0.191)*  (0.179)**  (0.214)** 
Constant 8.773  8.486***  7.938 
  0.679*** 0.650 1.015 
N  70 77 46 
     
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice. 
4. 
b) Terraces are only relevant for villages with steep slopes. 
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  Dependant variable: Absolute growth in share of stone houses 
  Period 1995-2001  Period 1990-2001  Period 1980-2001 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Irrigation  0.012 0.010 0.012 
(1) 1995 (2) 1990 (3) 1980
a) (0.004)*** (0.004)**  (0.004)*** 
F., P. & S.  0.010  0.011  0.003 
(1) 1995 (2) 1990 (3) 1980  (0.004)*** (0.005)**  (0.004) 
Male pop.  0.001  0.001   
per ha. 1995  (0.003)  (0.002)   
Population  0.022   
share  19-45 (0.018)   
Prim.  school  -0.001 0.003 0.003 
1980  (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Drink. water connection  0.009  0.010  0.010 
(1-2) 1990 (3) 1980  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.003)*** 
Constant  -0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) 
R
2 0.459 0.440 0.509 
N  70 70 70 
     
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice. 
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  Dependent Variable: Net immigration rate of households, various periods 
  1980-1990  1980-1990   1990-1995  1990-1995   1995-2001  1995-2001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Land  rights  (1-2)  1980 0.057  0.077 -0.010 -0.026 -0.034 -0.047 
 (3-4) 1990 (5-6) 1995  (0.052)  (0.056) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) 
Prim.  School    -0.042   -0.002   0.036 
1980    (0.051)   (0.030)   (0.039) 
Drink.  water    -0.055   0.036   0.001 
(1-2) 1980 (3-6) 1990    (0.042)    (0.027)    (0.031) 
Electricity    0.021   -0.019   0.050 
(1-2) 1980 (3-6) 1990    (0.056)    (0.035)    (0.037) 
Doctor    0.004   0.021   -0.023 
(1-2) 1980 (3-6) 1990    (0.045)    (0.026)    (0.028) 
Pop. Den. (1-2) 1980    -0.003    -0.001    0.007 
 (3-4) 1990 (5-6) 1995    (0.020)    (0.012)    (0.012) 
Share of fields on     -0.131    0.017    -0.036 
steep  slopes    (0.065)*   (0.111)   (0.052) 
Number of years to     0.001    0.002    0.001 
last  drought    (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Ln  altitude    0.012   0.001   0.014 
above  sea    (0.024)   (0.019)   (0.022) 
Access.  by    0.050   -0.003   -0.003 
car in 1980    (0.041)    (0.028)    (0.032) 
Constant  0.015  -0.028 0.024  -0.010 0.028  -0.097 
 (0.016)  (0.188)  (0.012)*** (0.151)  (0.015)* (0.171) 
R
2 0.017 0.172 0.006 0.176 0.009 0.074 
N  77 77 77 77 77 77 
        
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4.  
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  Dependent Variable: Technology use in 1990 
  Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer Pesticides  Imp.  Seeds  Terraces
 b)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Migration  0.118 0.215 0.255  -0.531 0.076 
1980-1990  (0.432) (0.439) (0.441) (0.436) (0.445) 
Primary  school  0.005 0.057 0.096 0.071 0.255 
1980  (0.165) (0.176) (0.177) (0.175) (0.218) 
Credit  available 0.334 0.437 0.141 0.261 0.252 
past  10  years  (0.196)*  (0.208)** (0.210) (0.207) (0.247) 
Newspaper  0.662 0.389 0.351 0.591  -0.255 
available (0.236)*** (0.252) (0.253) (0.250) (0.300) 
Constant  -0.008 0.104 0.397 0.109  -0.257 
  (0.249) (0.266) (0.268) (0.265) (0.324) 
R
2 0.162 0.101 0.045 0.118 0.063 
N  70 77 77 77 46 
       
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice. 
4. 
b) Terraces are only relevant for villages with steep slopes. 
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